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We have been exploring the acquisition of the causative alternation for a number of 
years. The causative alternation expresses the presence or absence of an external controller 
(Levin & Rappaport Hovav 1994). This is evidenced in the distinction between 'I broke my 
computer' and 'My computer broke'. The first sentence expresses the role of an external 
controller (me) that caused the action to talce place. The second sentence expresses the result 
of that action without implying a cause. 
Many English verbs do not undergo the causative alternation. One such exception is 
the verb cut. The sentence 'I cut the cloth' is acceptable, but not the sentence 'The cloth 
cut'. Such exceptions create a serious leamability problem for children acquiring English -
how to differentiate between the verbs that undergo the causative alternation and the verbs 
that do not. Children could not use positive evidence from the input language to learn such 
restrictions because positive evidence only indicates that a general rule for the causative 
alternation is available in English - not that there are exceptions to it. There is no evidence 
that parents offer any overt correction to children who overgeneralize the causative 
alternation to verbs such as cut. Children do eventually tum into adult speakers with this 
restriction so the question is how did they learn the restriction? 
One possibility is that children take a conservative approach to language and only 
produce what they hear in the language around them (Baker 1979). Such children would 
receive positive evidence that verbs such as break alternate since they would hear other 
speakers using these verbs in transitive as well as intransitive sentences. They would not hear 
speakers using cut in intransitive sentences, so they would not overgeneralize cut 
themselves. The one difficulty with the conservative learning approach is that we do hear 
children producing such sentences as 'The paper cut', that is overgeneralizing beyond the 
input to them (Bowerman 1974; Pye ct al. 1994). So conservative learning does not account 
for the acquisition of the causative alternation. 
Another solution would be to assume the distinction is innate. In this scenario children 
would be genetically equipped with the knowledge that the causative alternation is only 
applicable to a particular range of verbs. The lexical restrictions on such rules would be part 
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of universal grammar. This solution predicts that children would not make any mistakes, so 
it has the same problem that conservative learning has. Innate constraints also predict that all 
languages would have similar restrictions on such rules. Since Chinese and the Mayan 
language K'iche' (to name two) allow a verb cut to alternate in the same manner as their 
verb break, the UG explanation does not reflect actual language facts. So innate constraints 
will not explain the acquisition of the causative alternation. 
One solution that has received the most attention in the linguistics and language 
acquisition literature is to propose semantic distinctions that account for the differences in the 
syntactic behavior of verbs (Grimshaw 1990; Hale & Keyser 1986; Levin & Rappaport 1994; 
Pinker 1989). The problem with semantic solutions is that they substitute semantic make 
believe for syntactic precision. Figures 1 and 2, for example, display typical semantic 
analyses for break and cut (from Ravin 1990). These analyses follow Hale & Keyser (1986) 
in ascribing an extra contact component to the meaning of cut. Ravin links the contact 
component in cut to an Agent exerting physical effort. Note that apart from this component 
the semantic analysis of cut is similar to the analysis of break. 
The problem is that such analyses are not satisfactory semantic descriptions. 
Paraphrasing cut as 'breaking by applying an edge across an object' is ludicrous. Ravin has 
to specify some type of change in the condition of an object to distinguish break from a verb 
like move. Such a representation errs in being too specific regarding the final state of the 
object since many broken objects arc not divided into pieces, e.g. a broken computer or a 
broken leg. At the same time the representation errs in not being specific enough in that it 
does not distinguish between break and sever, where sever implies breaking into pieces. 
Without independent evidence for their constituent semantic features such analyses offer little 
advantage over an index marking verbs that undergo the causative alternation. The 
representations themselves are semantically unmotivated. 
A problem for semantically motivated syntactic verb subgroups is the variable 
syntactic behavior of verbs in different syntactic contexts. Radford (1988) provides an 
example of this problem in his textbook on syntax. It revolves around the issue of why 
breaking a promise, breaking the news, breaking the law, and breaking a lease all sound 
acceptable in transitive contexts while it is only possible to use news breaking in an 
intransitive context ('The news broke on the unsuspecting inhabitants'). Such behavior 
remains a mystery in an analysis that attributes syntactic restrictions to the semantic 
components of verbs (c.f. Goldberg 1992). 
The most severe problem such semantic analyses face is the fundamental inadequacy 
of feature theory as a tool for semantic analysis. Semantic features go back at least as far as 
Aristotle's De inlerpretanone. Feature theories come in various fonns from the classical 
fonn to more modern prototype and exemplar fonns. They all have in common the belief 
that meaning can be broken into a basic set of constituent atoms and that these semantic 
atoms, or features, account for word meaning (Fodor 1983). 
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Feature theories are inadequate at many levels. They predict sharp distinctions in 
word meaning that do not match our intuitions. (Compare break, sever and fracture, or rip 
and tear.) Feature theories imply that all speakers share similar semantic representations for 
the words in their lexicon. Putnam (1990) has pointed out that linguistic communities instead 
rely upon experts to distinguish elms from beaches, gold from bronze, or fractionating from 
titrating. Evidently our reliance upon such experts does not stop us from using such words in 
everyday communication. Feature theories do not supply an adequate account for semantic 
change and !:ultural evolution. Again Putnam (1990) has noted that water is much the same 
for us and the ancient Greeks, notwithstanding several thousand years worth of accumulated 
chemical wisdom. The irony is that so many generative grammarians ascribe to some fonn of 
feature theory when feature theories are incapable of capturing the generative capacity of the 
semantic component. 
The most difficult problem for semantic feature theories is leamability. How are 
children supposed to determine the semantic features associated with each word in the 
language? This problem was originally raised by Quine (1960) in the context of his 
discussion of radical translation. Quine used the situation of a linguist faced with the 
difficulty of translating the native word gavagai as his prime example of radical translation. 
He has been taken to task ever since by linguists who fail to comprehend the seriousness of 
the problem (Katz 1990). The problem obviously exists for children who do not have access 
to a translation manual between the language of their community and their own prclinguistic 
cognitive systems. Quine took the radical step of theorizing that children never wind up with 
the same meanings for words, maintaining that meaning by its very nature is indcterminant. 
In other words, none of us would agree on the exact range of referents for most words. 
The breaking domain provides clear evidence to support Quinc's indctcrrninancy 
thesis. It is obviously impossible to envision how every object will break. There are, 
hopefully, an infinite number of objects to be made from an infinite number of substances yet 
to be invented. None of us can say whether such objects will break, fracture, tear, or 
decompose. Without a shared experience of such objects our linguistic community cannot 
agree ahead of time on which ones will break. 
Different linguistic communities have had time and opportunity to divide the breaking 
domain in different ways. The Mayan language K'iche' provides a good example of the 
crosslinguistic variation to be found within this domain (sec Appendix), e.g. 
-chiko:j/-chikoxik [to break by throwing the object itself, e.g. chest, stool, pot] 
-ch'akati:j/-ch'a.kat:ixik [to break off a small piece, e.g. bread to feed hens] 
-etz.alob'a:j/-etz.alob'ik [to break down; ruin, e.g. computer, car, zipper] 
-jochopi:j/-jochopinik [to break a banana by failing to support the whole bunch] 
-joyopi:j/-joyopinik [to break a banana from a bunch of bananas] 
-paxi:j/-paxik [to break clay, rock, e.g. glass, plate, cup, rock, pot) 
-pitz'itz'e:j/-pitz'itz'exik [to crush something soft, e.g. clay] 
-pi'i:j/-pi'inik [to break something soft, e.g. book, tortilla, clay, hardboiled egg; to split or 
break hair, plate; to divide, e.g. road] 
-qasa:j/-qajik [to descend; to break in a downward fashion, e.g. arm, leg, stick, tree] 
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-q'upi:j/-q'upinik [to break something hard, e.g. bridge, darn, candle, basket, stick, chair, 
tooth] 
-raqi:j/-raqinik [to smash something hollow, e.g. glass, pot, plate, chest, bubble] 
-t'oqopi:j/-t'oqopinik [to sever something long and flexible, e.g. rope, wire, string; to pluck 
hair) 
-weqi:j/-weqinik [to smash something hard, e.g. pot, wall, stone griddle, mile post] 
-woqi:j/-woqinik [to shatter something fragile, e.g. eggs, vase, lightbulb) 
Such distinctions indicate that the English word break is far from a simple lexical expression 
of our underlying perception of events. There is no reason to consider its meaning to be 
especially transparent for children. Children learning English have to eliminate all the 
semantic distinctions that children learning K'iche' are forced to make. Nor is it simply a 
matter of eliminating restrictions since languages such as Korean or Winnebago impose 
entirely different sets of distinctions. 
Perhaps a small demonstration is in order. It is surprisingly easy to invent new things 
to break and new ways of breaking them. Our experiments have investigated the role of the 
object, instrument and result in the distinction between breaking and cutting. Our objects 
include playdoh, peanuts, crackers, paper and dental floss. Our instruments include hands, 
rulers, scissors, string and a pencil. Finally, our actions include a scissors action with the 
hand and a cutting action with the ruler and string. We have carried out this experiment with 
both children and adults. Their responses are shown in tables 1,2 and 3. 
The group data does not begin to do justice to the individual variation to be found in 
such a task. A comparison of individual responses for the children and adults reveals a great 
deal of variation between the individual child and adult responses. The children show more 
variation than the adults, but there are still significant differences between adults in the types 
of actions they consider to be breaking or cutting. These results support Quine's thesis in that 
there is a great deal of variation between individual children and adults. We did not find 
anything like universal agreement on what constitutes an act of breaking versus cutting or 
tearing. Whatever concepts children and adults use to make such distinctions do not lead to a 
unanimity of opinion concerning these novel actions. There is no evidence that English 
speakers resort to particular semantic features when extending verbs to novel actions. 
The results are compatible with an interpretation in which speakers construct their 
own theories of word meaning. Each individual must decide which attributes of a situation 
constitute defining elements for the word break. Our theories of word meaning evolve as we 
encounter more evidence of the scope of word usage. Our theories may change as our 
evidence changes, reflecting changing patterns of usage in our linguistic communities. 
Changes in meaning are independent of changes in verb subcategorization. Verbs arc free to 
enter causative alternations or not depending on accidents of history. There is ample evidence 
of such change in English (Visser 1963). 
This still leaves the original problem of how children decide to restrict the causative 
alternation to particular verbs. I think the best solution lies along the lines of paradigm 
construction. Pinker proposed paradigm construction as a means children could use to 
1994 MALC 
Making the Cut 219 
Table l. Percentage of children (adults) responding with break·. 
% break hand ruler scissors string pencil 
playdoh 1.0 (.23) .16 (·) .5 (-) .67 (.23) 
peanut .67 (.5) .33 (.04) 
cracker .67 (.41) .5 (.59) .67 (.68) 
paper .5 (-) .3~ (-) .16 (·) .33 (-) .33 (-) 
·6 children122 adults (shown in parentheses) 
Table 2. Percentage of children (adults) responding with cut•. 
% cut hand ruler scissors string pencil 
playdoh - (-) .67 (1.0) .s (.95) .16 (.04) 
peanut .16 (.5) .67 (.95) 
cracker .16 (.59) .16 (.32) .16 (.27} 
paper .16 (.27} - (.18) .84 (1.0) - (.18) .16 (-) 
· ·6 children/22 adults 
Table 3. Percentage of children (adults) responding with tear•. 
% tear hand ruler scissors string pencil 
playdoh - (.23) .16 (-) - (.04) .16 (.73) 
peanut -(-) -(-) 
cracker .16 (-) .16 (.O'J) - (.04) 
paper .33 (.73) .67 (.82) -(-) .67 (.82) .s (1.0) 
·6 children/22 adults 
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acquire inflections (1984). Children presumably note the formal similarities and differences 
between the words play/played, jump/jumped and break/broke, to construct a paradigm 
for the regular and irregular past tense infle.ction. Children overgeneralize the regular past 
tense inflection -ed to the irregular verbs until they realize that the irregular past tense forms 
displace the regularized forms (c.f. Marcus et al. 1992). 
A similar solution suggests itself for the acquisition of the causative alternation (c.f. 
Lord 1979). Children could construct paradigms for intransitive and transitive uses of verbs 




NPl break NP2 
NP2 open NP2 tear 
NPl open NP2 NPl tear NP2 
Such subcategorization information is part of the lexical entry for verbs and therefore 
available for the construction of verbal paradigms. In languages that contain overt causative 
inflections, such as K'iche', children presumably construct causative paradigms for the affix 
in the same way they construct paradigms for tense or aspect. 
Paradigm construction would capture the acquisition of suppletive causative pairs in 
exactly the way it accounts for the acquisition of irregular past tense forms. At first, children 
would fail to realize that die/kill, come/bring, eat/feed, stay/keep, etc. form a suppletive 
relation with respect to the causative alternation. Children that failed to observe this relation 
would be tempted to extend the intransitive verbs to transitive contexts and vice versa. 
Roughly 90 percent of children's causative overgeneralizations involve such suppletive pairs, 
so paradigm construction would explain a major proportion of children's errors with the 
causative alternation. 
One difficulty for a paradigm account are verbs with fixed transitivity and no 
suppletive partners. Intransitive verbs such as disappear, glimmer and shiver, and transitive 
verbs such as cut, put and throw do not have a lexical means to express an event in another 
transitivity perspective. They require a syntactic device such as the periphrastic or passive 
constructions to alternate transitivity. At first glance, such syntactic constructions appear to 
be outside the scope of lexical paradigms, but Williams (1994) suggests otherwise. He notes 











more regular most regular 
The lesson Williams draws from such examples is that the lexical entries may contain 
more syntactic information than the individual part of speech. Significantly, this additional 
information includes phrasal constructions that the word appears in. The exceptional 




NP 1 make NP2 disappear 
NP2 was cut 
NPl cut NP2 
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As an explanation for language acquisition, paradigm construction has the obvious 
advantage that it makes no distinctions between lexical, suppletive, morphological and 
phrasal alternations. Languages are free to use any of these means to express the causative 
alternation and do. Indeed, languages like English and K'iche' use multiple means to express 
the causative alternation. Paradigm formation also txplains children's overgeneralizations in a 
uniform manner. A significant prediction may be that all such errors of commission, as 
opposed to errors of omission, may be attributed to an insufficiently structured lexicon. 
Finally, paradigm formation avoids the problem of semantic indetenninancy. In fact, 
semantic indeterminancy may explain why children have difficulty constructing paradigms for 
suppletive and phrasal forms in the first place. They would not be able to use lexical form as 
a guide to semantic similarity and would then require some experience with the forms to 
detennine that they form a paradigm. 
Paradigm construction is not a perfect explanation for the acquisition of the causative 
alternation. One significant problem is that paradigm formation would not account for the 
degree of crosslinguistic similarity in the words that use lexical and morphological forms to 
express the causative alternation (Nedyalkov & Silnitsky 1973). Differences between 
Chinese, English and K'iche' demonstrate that such similarity is merely a statistical trend 
rather than a rule of universal grammar. As such, we may attribute such accidental 
similarities to processing needs (Zipf 1935). 
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APPENDIX (K'iche' Breaking Vexbs) 
-chiko:j/-chi.koxik [to break by throwing the object itself, e.g. chest, stool, pot] 
.:Chup/-chupik [to snuff out something, e.g. candle, light; to erase marks] 
-ch'akati:j/-ch'akatixik [to break off a small piece, e.g. bread to feed hens] 
-ch'ol/-ch'o:lik [to peel, e.g. fruit, vegetables, animals, skin] 
-ch'up/-ch'upik [to pick large fruit, e.g. peaches, pineapples, melons] 
-b'oq/-b'oqik [to pick a plant from the ground, roots and all, e.g. onions] 
-etz.alob'a:j/-etz.alob'ik (to break down; ruin, e.g. computer, car, zipper] 
-jach'/.jach'ik [to pick com, e.g. the cob, the ear, the kernels, the hU.U] 
-jisi:j/-jisinik [to crack, slit, e.g. glass, paper; to operate on someone] 
-jixi:j/-jixinik [to tear leaves along the veins] 
-jochopi:j/-jochopinik [to break a banana by failing to support the whole bunch] 
-jok' /-jok'ik [to grind, e.g. lime, rice, wheat] 
-jol/-jolik [to pull entire leaf and part of stem from com in a downward motion] 
-joyopi:j/-joyopinik [to break a banana from a bunch of bananas] 
-kabiq/-kabiqik [to shell com by twisting the cob in one's hands] 
-ke'c:j/-kc'cxik [to grind corn] 
-k'et/k'etik [to shell corn with one's thumb - imitating a hen pecking com] 
-mak/-makik [to pick small beans, e.g. coffee, beans] 
-mich'/·mich'ik: [to chop, e.g. plants; to pluck, e.g. feathers, pine needles] 
-pachale:j/-pachalexik [to smash something with one's foot] 
·paq'i:j/-paq'inik [to split, e.g. boards, watennelon, balloon] 
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-paxi:j/-paxik [to break clay, rock, e.g. glass, plate, cup, rock, pot] 
-pitz'itz'e:j/-pitz'itz'exik [to crush something soft, e.g. clay] 
-pi'i:j/-pi'inik [to break something soft, e.g. book, tortilla, clay, hardboiled egg; to split or 
break hair, plate; to divide, e.g. road] 
-pich'i:j/-pich'inik [to squash bugs, e.g. lice, fleas, wonns] 
-poq'i:j/-poq 'ik [to pop," e.g. bubble, balloon; to explode, e.g. bomb] 
-qasa:j/-qajik [to descend; to break in a downward fashion, e.g. arm, leg, stick, tree] 
-q'ipi:j/-q'ipinik [to chip; to make smaller, e.g. mug, roll up pants legs, break sticks across 
one's knee for kindling] 
-q'oll-q'olilc [to pick leaves by tearing across the base of the leaf, e.g. picking flowers, 
leaves to wrap tamales and tortillas] 
-q'upi:j/-q'upinik [to break something hard, e.g. bridge, dam, candle, basket, stick, chair, 
tooth] 
-rach'aqi:jl-rach'aqinik [to tear, e.g. pants, cloth, paper] 
-raqi:j/-raqinik [to smash something hollow, e.g. glass, pot, plate, chest, bubble] 
-sak'i:j/-sak'inik (to crack, e.g. wall, melon, pot, plate, glass, skull, tree, board] 
-t'oqopi:j/-t'oqopinik [to sever something long and flexible, e.g. rope, wire, string; to pluck: 
hair] 
·t'ub'i:j/-t'ub'inik [to tear, e.g. paper, clothes] 
-weqi:j/-wcqinik [to smash something hard, e.g. pot, wall, stone griddle, mile post] 
-woqi:j/-woqinik [to shatter something fragile, e.g. eggs, vase, lightbulb] 
-xull-xulik [to pick something by the stem, e.g. grapes] 
-yoji:j/-yojinik [to dismantle something, e.g. table, bed, house, car] 
-yokoke:j/-yokokenik [to crumple something, e.g. aluminum cans, paper cups] 
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